U.S. Supreme Court Case Law
“Until 1870, only aliens being free white persons were eligible to citizenship. In that year, aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent were made eligible.”
— Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402 (1925)
“Later acts have extended eligibility of aliens to citizenship to the following group: in [July 14] 1870, ‘aliens of African nativity and… persons of African descent,’ 16 Stat. 254, 256; c254, 18 USCA § 142, 7 FCA title 7, § 142;”
— Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)
“No one doubts that the Amendment, as soon as it was promulgated, applied to persons of African descent born in the United States, wherever the birthplace of their parents might have been; and yet for two years afterwards, there was no statute authorizing persons of that race to be naturalized.”
— United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
“The children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens.”
— United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (citing Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 3 Pet. 99)
“The allegiance of an individual is not to be transferred from one sovereign to another except by his own consent and by his own acts; these principles are applicable to inhabitants of ceded or conquered territory and to immigrants.”
— Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)
“To remove this difficulty primarily, and to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States, and also citizenship of a state, the first clause of the first section was framed.”
— Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
“The 1st clause of the 14th article was primarily intended to confer citizenship on the negro race; and secondly, to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and citizenship of the states, and it recognizes the distinction between citizenship of a state and citizenship of the United States by those definitions.”
— Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
“Of the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the state, and what they respectively are, we will presently consider, but we wish to state here that it is only the former (U.S. citizens) which are placed by this clause under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter (state citizen), whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the Amendment.”
— Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
“It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the United States except as he was a citizen of one of the states composing the Union. Those, therefore, who had been born and resided always in the District of Columbia or in the territories, though within the United States, were not citizens.”
— Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
United States Code (USC)
Title 1 USC § 1 (The Dictionary Act)
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise—the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”
Title 8 USC § 1101(b)(3)
“The term “person” means an individual or an organization.”
Title 26 USC § 7701(a)(1)
“When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—
(1) Person: The term “person” shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.”
Title 26 USC § 7701(a)(30)
“(30) United States person: The term “United States person” means—
(A) a citizen or resident of the United States,
(B) a domestic partnership,
(C) a domestic corporation,
(D) any estate (other than a foreign estate, within the meaning of paragraph (31)), and
(E) any trust if (i) a court within the United States is able to exercise primary supervision over the administration of the trust, and (ii) one or more United States persons have the authority to control all substantial decisions of the trust.”